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I. INTRODUCTION
With the progress of society and development of democracy of nation, the needs of the voting are more and more intense. Owning to the popularity of Internet, many transactions can be processed through Internet, so the people have the higher requirements of Internet voting. Internet voting protocol is the base of the Internet voting system.
Internet voting protocol can be classified into two classes based on if they need authority. One needs not authority, such as [1] . This kind of protocol is fewer. The other needs authority, which can be categorized by different technologies into three schemes.
The first is homomorphic scheme, such as [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17] . The voter cooperates with the authorities in order to construct an encryption of his vote. Due to the homomorphic property, an encryption of the sum of the votes is obtained by multiplying the encrypted ballots of all voters. Finally, the result of the election is computed from the sum of the votes, which is jointly decrypted by the authorities. The purposes of homomorphic encryption method are protection of the voter's privacy and advancement of the efficacy of tally ballots. Generally the homomorphic encryption scheme is not receipt-free. The first voting protocol of this scheme was introduced by Benaloh [15] . Crameret et al. protocol [4] proposed by is representative.
The second is blind signature scheme, such as [18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25] . Fujioka et al. protocol [20] is representative. Generally the blind signatures scheme is not receipt-free because the blinding factor is the receipt. The voter firstly obtains a token, a blindly signed message unknown to anyone except himself. Next, the voter sends his token together with his vote. These protocols require voter's participation in more rounds. Generally the protocols need two authorities. One is administrator which responsible for issuing the ballots and generating the blind signature of ballots. The other is collector which responsible for tallying the ballot and publish the result.
The third is mix net scheme, such as [8, 13, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32] . These protocols use the mix net to implement the privacy. The key idea of Mix nets is to permute and modify the sequence of objects in order to hide the correspondence between elements of original and final sequence. David Chaum introduced this idea in 1981 as a realization of anonymous channel. Internet voting protocols of mix net scheme use the mix net to mix the possible ballot and send done permutations secretly to the voter.
The secure and practical Internet voting protocol should have the following properties:
Basic properties: privacy, completeness, soundness, unreusability, fairness, eligibility, and invariableness.
Expanded properties: universal verifiability, receiptfreeness [2, 18] , coercion-resistance [12] Universal verifiability: Any one can verify the fact that the election is fair and the published tally is correctly computed from the ballots that were correctly cast.
Receipt-freeness: The voter can not produce a receipt to prove that he votes a special ballot. Its purpose is to protect against vote buying. Receipt-freeness was introduced by Benaloh and Tuinstra [2] . They proposed a receipt-free scheme based on the voting-booth. Hirt and Sako [8] point out that their scheme is not receiptfreeness.
Coercion-resistance [12] : A coercion-resistant voting protocol should offer not only receipt-freeness, but also defense against randomization, forced-abstention, and simulation attacks.
At present the hot point is how to realize universal verifiability, receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance with few assumption or constraints. There are three traditional methods: secure multi-party computation [42] , deniable encryption [38] and designated verifier proof [10, 12, 40] to implement the receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance. According to our analysis we found that the three methods in Internet voting protocol have several problems. So in this paper we apply a new method: deniable authentication protocol and proof protocol that two ciphertexts are encryption of the same plaintext to implement the receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance.
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows.
1. An improved proof protocol that two ciphertexts are encryption of the same plaintext is developed.
2. A receipt-free and coercion-resistant Internet voting protocol based on non-interactive deniable authentication protocol and an improved proof protocol that two ciphertexts are encryption of the same plaintext is introduced.
Organization of the paper: In Section II the related work is discussed. An improved proof protocol that two ciphertexts are encryption of the same plaintext is proposed in Section III. In Section IV a brief overview Meng non-interactive deniable authentication protocol that is used in the proposed Internet voting protocol is presented. In Section V the secure Internet voting protocol with receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance is proposed. Then we analyze the proposed protocol in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
In the past a lot of Internet voting protocols uses ad hoc physical assumption to accomplish receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance, Such as, one or two-way untappable channels and/or anonymous or private channels [5, 8, 12, 18, 26] , third-party honest verifiers [35] , smartcards [29] , voting booth [2, 33] , the third randomizer [5, 13, 34] ,tamper-resistant randomizer [9] .
At present the hot point is how to realize universal verifiability, receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance with few physical assumptions. There are three traditional methods: secure multi-party computation [42] , deniable encryption [38] and designated verifier proof [10, 12, 40] to implement the receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance.
Zhong et al. [42] use secure multi-party computation to implement the receipt-freeness. But in Zhong et al. protocol the voter need to involve the all phase, which is not comfortable for the voter's experience. At the same time it uses the secure channel to implement the receiptfreeness, which is a very strong physical assumption.
Rja¡¦skov´a [38] uses the deniable encryption to implement the receipt-freeness. Because deniable encryption is only process one bit in each run this method can not support the other voting ballot forms. Such as chose one from many, write in ballot.
Juels et al. [12] researched coercion-resistance firstly. Acquisti protocol [10] applies the idea of Juels et al. [12] . Juels et al. [12] and Acquisti [10] mainly applied the credential of voter and designated verifier proof to accomplish it. Voter can cheat the coercer by producing a false credential. Owning to designate verifier proof the coercer can not verify the proof.
The key idea of Juels [12] is that for the identity of a voter to remain hidden during the election process and for the validity of ballots instead to be checked blindly against a voter roll. When casting a ballot, a voter incorporates a concealed credential. This takes the form of a ciphertext on a secret value that is unique to the voter. The secret value is a kind of anonymous credential. To ensure that legitimate voters cast ballots, the tallying authority performs a blind comparison between hidden credentials and a list of encrypted credentials published by an election registrar alongside of the plaintext names of registered voters.
According to our analysis we found that it has the following problems: (1) can not prevent the "1009 attacks"; (2) do not defense against forced-abstention and simulation attacks ;( 3) can not support write in ballot.
In Acquisti protocol [10] the election authorities provide shares of credentials to each voter, along with designated verifier proofs of each share's validity. Using homomorphic encryption, the voter assembles the shares and combines them with her own vote that is cast on a public bulletin board. All messages in the bulletin board can be decrypted by a coalition of the election authorities after the voting phase of the election is completed.
But according to our analysis of Acquisti protocol [10], we find that it has the following problems: a. It is not invariableness. In Acquisti protocol the voter can use per credential to vote many times. In other words the voter can use per credential to vote the same ballot many times and also can use per credential to vote different ballot many times. In the tallying phrase the author only deals with the status that the voter can use per credential to vote the same ballot many times. The other status that voter can use per credential to vote different ballot many times does not be considered. So on that status we use the search algorithm in the tallying phrase, the tally result may be different. So it is not property of invariableness. This is an important problem.
b. It is not receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance. According to the definition of coercion-resistance we know that if an Internet protocol is not receipt-free, it is not coercion-resistant. So we firstly point that Acquisti protocol is not receipt-freeness. 
According to the definition of coercion-resistance Acquisti protocol is not coercion-resistance.
Meng protocol [40] is a practical and efficient Internet voting protocol with the secure properties and addresses the problems of Acquisti protocol. At the same time Meng protocol has the following specialties:(1)Have the properties of privacy, completeness, soundness, fairness, invariableness, universal verifiability, receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance;(2) Without of strong physical assumption;(3) Solve the problems that have not property of invariableness, can not prevent the "1009 attacks" and application of the tappable channel in Acquisti protocol.
In this paper we apply a new method, which is deniable authentication protocol and proof protocol that two ciphertexts are encryption of the same plaintext, to implement receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance.
Deniable authentication protocol allow a sender to authenticate a message for a receiver, in a way that the receiver can not convince a third party that such authentication (or any authentication) ever took place. Deniable authentication has two characteristics that differ from traditional authentication:
1. Only the intended receiver can authenticate the true source of a given message.
2. The receiver can't prove the source of the message to a third party.
In the past the deniable authentication protocol has been studied. The deniable authentication protocol can be fall into two categories: interactive deniable authentication protocols and non-interactive deniable authentication protocols [41, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48] . The interactive deniable authentication protocols are inefficient. Hence research on non-interactive deniable authentication protocols is the future direction. All the protocols [41, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48] have not strong deniability. Meng non-interactive deniable authentication protocol [41] based on discrete logarithm problem has secure properties: completeness, strong deniability, weak deniability, security of forgery attack, security of impersonate attack, security of compromising session secret attack, and security of man-in-the-middle attack.
To our knowledge the research on the proof protocol that two ciphertexts are encryption of the same plaintext is at the beginning. Baudron et al. [5] proposed an interactive proof protocol based on paillier cryptosystem. Acquisti [10] applied the idea of Baudron et al and proposed an interactive proof protocol based on paillier cryptosystem with the condition p=2. Goulet et al. [11] proposed an interactive protocol based on ElGamal cryptosystem. But we found that Goulet et al' proof protocol is wrong. We give an improved proof protocol that two ciphertexts are encryption of the same plaintext.
So we use Meng non-interactive deniable authentication protocol and an improved proof protocol that two ciphertexts are encryption of the same plaintext to implement the receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance.
III. AN IMPROVED PROOF PROTOCOL THAT TWO CIPHERTEXTS ARE ENCRYPTION OF THE SAME PLAINTEXT
To our knowledge the research on the proof protocol that two ciphertexts are encryption of the same plaintext is at the beginning. Baudron et al. [5] proposed an interactive proof protocol based on paillier cryptosystem. Acquisti [10] applied the idea of Baudron et al. and proposed an interactive proof protocol based on paillier cryptosystem with the condition p=2. Goulet et al. [11] proposed an interactive protocol based on ElGamal cryptosystem. But we found that Goulet et al.' proof protocol is wrong. In the following we address the problem of Goulet et al. and give an improved proof protocol that two ciphertexts are encryption of the same plaintext:
In the protocol we need two public and private keys: ; ,g is a generator of multiplicative .
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, , sends to verifier. If we repeat the above procedure z times, we see that a lying prover only succeeds with a probability
,which is a probability that shrinks quickly if we repeat enough times. Thus, the verifier can be sure with a large probability that the plaintext equivalence is true after a number of run of this proof.
IV.AN OVERVIEW OF MENG NON-INTERACTIVE DENIABLE AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL
Meng non-interactive deniable authentication protocol is the secure and has properties: completeness, strong deniability, weak deniability, security of forgery attack, security of impersonate attack, security of compromising session secret attack, and security of man-in-the-middle attack.
Strong deniability [49] : After execution of the deniable authentication protocol the sender can deny to have ever authenticated anything to receiver. Weak deniability [49] : The deniable authentication protocol is deniable. The receiver can prove to have spoken to the sender but not the content of what the sender authenticated in a way that the receiver can't convince a third party that such authentication.
Meng protocol supposes that the attacker can not monitor the communication between the sender and receiver in the non-interactive deniable authentication protocol.
Meng non-interactive deniable authentication protocol is briefly described as the following:
Initialized phrase The Authority chooses a large prime numbers p, and computes a random multiplicative generator element g in finite field of p elements: GF (p). Lastly he sends the g, p to the bullet board.
The sender picks a serial random numbers , and computes his public key by i .Lastly, sender sends the to the bullet board.
The receiver picks a random numbers , and computes his public key by .Lastly, the sender sends the to the bullet board. ( )
The proof of security can be found in Ref. [41] V.THE PROPOSED SECURE INTERNET VOTING PROTOCOL
The idea of the proposed secure Internet voting protocol with receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance is that: if everyone knows that the voter has the ability that generates the fake evidence, when the voter provides the evidence to the vote-buyer, the voter-buyer has not the ability to verify the evidence, so the vote-buyer does not give the money to the voter. So the proposed Internet voting protocol has receipt-freeness and against of and randomization attack.
How to make the voter to have ability that generates the fake evidence? Owning to the strong deniability of Meng non-interactive deniable authentication protocol we can use it to implement the ability.
The proposed Internet voting protocol applies the encryption technologies which include threshold ElGamal cryptosystem, mix net [27, 36] , homomorphic encryption, Meng non-interactive deniable authentication protocol and the improved proof protocol that knowledge that two ciphertexts are encryption of the same plaintext.
A.The protocol
The proposed Internet voting protocol includes four phases: preparation phase, registration phase, voting phase and tallying phase. ( ) Preparation phase Authorities and voters generate the public/private ElGamal keys. The private keys of voter and authorities are secret Authorities generate the ballot and send and its digital signature to bulletin board denoted by BB. ( )
Tallying phase (1) According to the rules the authorities eliminate the duplicate and its corresponding in Table I . The results store in Table II . Table IV and , in Table V. ( )
Authorities decrypt in Table IV and in Table V . In order to verify correctness of decryption by people, authority stores the proof of correctness of decryption in Table IV and Table V respectively. Table IV, authority finds in Table V which is corresponding to that is equal to in Table IV . Authority stores in Table VI .
(5) Authorities decrypt in Table VI and get . The proof of correctness of decryption is stored in Table VI .
(6) Authority tallies the ballot in Table VI and stores its results in Table VI . 
Proof of correctness of decryption
THE AND
proof of correctness of decryption 
So the proposed Internet voting protocol is universal verifiability.
Receipt-freeness The proposed Internet voting protocol accomplishes receipt-freeness by confidentiality of voter credential and the proposed deniable authentication protocol.
Voter checks equality between credential from authority and credential in BB by proof protocol that knowledge that two ciphertexts are encryption of the same plaintext . Other peoples can not check owning to the specialty of the meng deniable authentication protocol. According to the Meng deniable authentication protocol voter has the ability of generation of a fake . The vote-buyer can't check 
E c
So the protocol is receipt-freeness. Coercion-resistance According to definition of coercion-resistance, firstly the protocol is receipt-freeness, and then prevents randomization attack, forced-abstention attack and simulation attack.
We have already analyzed that it is receipt-free. In the following we analyze that it can prevent randomization attack, Forced-abstention attack and simulation attack.
(1) Randomization attack Voter wants to prevent randomization attack. He can generate a false credential to cheat coercer because coercer can not recognize it true or false. Then voter can use true credential to vote a ballot. So the protocol can prevent randomization attack.
(2) Forced-abstention attack According to protocol coercer can not know if voter has registered based on BB and if voter has vote. So the protocol can prevent Forced-abstention attack.
(3) Simulation attack Coercer can vote on voter behalf after getting private key of voter. But we suppose that the private key of voter is secret in our protocol. So the protocol can prevent simulation attack.
VII.CONCLUSION
Internet voting protocol is base of Internet voting system. In this paper Firstly, an improved proof protocol that two ciphertexts are encryption of the same plaintext is introduced. Secondly, a receipt-free and coercionresistant Internet voting protocol based on non-interactive deniable authentication protocol and an improved proof protocol that two ciphertexts are encryption of the same plaintext is developed. Thirdly, we analyze the proposed Internet voting protocol. The proposed Internet voting protocol has the properties of universal verifiability, receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance and do not use the strong physical assumptions. Fourth, we compare security properties of Fujioka et al. [20] , Cramer et al. [4] , Juels et al. [12] , Acquisti [10] protocols with our present protocol. Owning to the space limitation we only give the analyzed result described as in Table VIII .
In the future we will use the protocol analyzer ProVerif [50] based on the applied pi calculus to analyze the universal verifiability, receipt-freeness and coercionresistance properties of the proposed Internet voting protocol. At the same time we will develop an Internet voting system based on our proposed protocol. 
